Seitenhistorie

• It should remain possible to discover also non-open data should be discoverable through SDIs (based on standardised metadata) and usable in protected environments like data spaces).
• It is our understanding that data spaces (incl. the one on the Green Deal) are already investigating how confidential/non-open data can be shared in protected environments. Such work should be considered in the revision of INSPIRE.
• Potentially, also data intermediaries could have a role hereGBR: Data intermediaries could potentially take responsibility for managing data spaces.

Responses (Brandenburg):

• In very few cases, INSPIRE data involves critical infrastructure data. The OpenData concept should be the main focus. If security mechanisms are nonetheless required, “data spaces” are currently being discussed as part of a solution. If this is a viable path, user-friendly and practical applications should be technically implemented by central institutions in the member states (in Germany, federal authorities).
• The relevant information (licenses, costs, terms of use, etc.) should be recorded within the metadata of data and services.
• International standards and the points already mentioned (see above) have to be considered. It should be examined whether the standards of W3C and WSS (OGC) for access authentication are sufficient for protection needs and whether Shibboleth technology could potentially be used (access protection).
• The additional installation of software tools for accessing sensitive or chargeable geoservices via connectors (data spaces) and data trustees is watched critically, since it is another obstacle for data access.

• data Data providers have already implemented mechanisms to protect their data, a common framework will be difficult to establish (e. g. Germany has failed to introduce federated access control in the past)
• BMEL: The differences in the IT security requirements of the various data providers make it quite difficult to adopt a harmonised approach.

Responses (Brandenburg):

• Restrictive access to INSPIRE data creates a barrier to its use.
• Protected access generates costs and administrative efforts to control access.
• A restrictive data access policy endangers the development of an interoperable and cross-border geodata infrastructure, as national and individual approaches may take precedence.
• Anonymizing data reduces its quality and usefulness.
• Different requirements for access, data protection, etc., could cause difficulties in the interoperable implementation of a Europe-wide geodata infrastructure.